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Este trabalho avalia o “canal de empréstimos bancários” na transmissão da política 
monetária. A análise foca os dados mensais desagregados do balanço patrimonial dos 
bancos brasileiros de dezembro de 1994 a dezembro de 2001. Em adição à taxa básica 
de juros de curto prazo, esse estudo considera os efeitos de um outro instrumento de 
política, representado pelos recolhimentos compulsórios sobre todos os depósitos à 
vista, de poupança e a prazo. Tais recolhimentos compulsórios são muito usados pela 
autoridade monetária no Brasil. A partir de técnicas de análise de dados em painel 
dinâmico, os resultados dos testes sugerem que o impacto da política monetária é mais 
forte sobre os empréstimos dos grandes bancos. Esse achado decorre de taxas de 
recolhimentos compulsórios de caráter progressivo, que afeta mais fortemente os bancos 









This paper evaluates the relevance of the “bank lending channel” of the monetary policy 
transmission in Brazil. Disaggregated monthly data of Brazilian banks balance sheets 
from December 1994 to December 2001 are analyzed. In addition to the short-term 
interest rate, we consider the effects of another policy instrument represented by reserve 
requirements on overall deposits – demand, savings, and time deposits. Reserve 
requirements have been widely used by the monetary authority in Brazil. Dynamic 
panel data techniques are employed. Our results suggest that the impact of monetary 
policy is stronger for the loans of the larger banks. This finding results from progressive 
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  11. Introduction 
 
Between 1994 and 2001, total credit in Brazil reduced from 37% of GDP to 
27%. Even without considering such fall, the credit-to-GDP ratio in Brazil was 
historically very low when compared to other emergent economies. For example, in 
Chile this ratio amounted to 58.76 % between 1998 and 2001 while in Mexico bank 
credit reached 50.62% of GDP between 1994 and 2000.  
Such low credit/GDP ratio has been mentioned as a possible reason to ignore the 
existence of a potential credit channel in the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
for Brazil (Bogdanski et al. 2000). The issue of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms in the country and, in special, the relevance of the credit channel has been 
receiving great attention from the domestic literature. Souza Sobrinho & Nakane (2002) 
evaluate the empirical relevance of the credit channel by studying aggregate data 
reaching the conclusion that bank credit works as a monetary policy transmission in 
Brazil. By contrast, Graminho & Bonomo (2002), following Kashyap & Stein (2000)’s 
methodology, make use of disaggregated data for Brazilian banks to conclude that rises 
in the short-term interest rate relax liquidity constraints in balance sheets of the 
Brazilian financial institutions. The authors attribute such result to the positive link 
between interest rate variations and bank profits. Based on such evidence, the authors 
conclude that the credit channel does not operate in Brazil. 
The purpose of this paper is to revisit the evidence on the bank lending channel 
of monetary policy transmission in Brazil. We study monthly data on banks’ balance 
sheets from December 1994 to December 2001. For industrialized countries, the 
monetary policy indicator is usually a short-term interest rate under the Central Bank 
control. This is also the indicator used by Graminho & Bonomo (2002). We argue that 
the short-term interest rate only partially captures the stance of the monetary policy in 
Brazil. When we consider a broader indicator of monetary policy to encompass all the 
required reserves on different types of deposits (demand, savings, and time deposits) we 
show that there is evidence for a transmission mechanism working through bank 
lending. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two makes the argument in favor of a 
broader monetary policy indicator for Brazil. Section three presents the basic model. 
Section four discusses data issues. Section five shows the empirical results. The final 
section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Monetary policy indicators 
 
The usual monetary policy indicator found in the literature a short-term interest 
rate under the Central Bank’s control. The short-term interest rate used in this paper is 
the overnight selic interest rate. 
However, another important monetary policy instrument in Brazil is the required 
reserve ratio on demand deposits. When the stabilization Real plan was launched in July 
1994, such ratio was set to 100% at the margin. After some reductions, it reached 45% 
by December 2001. In addition, required reserves were also set for time deposits, 
savings deposits, other bank liabilities, and even for some operations on bank assets. 
The rates on such required reserves are frequently changed by the Central Bank for 
  2liquidity control purposes.
1 Thus, it seems natural to consider the effects of such 
required reserves on the variations of bank credit in the country.  
 







1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001













1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001





















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
IPCA (12 months acummulated rate)
%
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the R$/US$ exchange rate, of the overnight selic 
interest rate, of the inflation rate as measured by the monthly variation of the IBGE’s 
IPCA, and of the 12-month accumulated inflation rate. Brazil was under two different 
monetary policy regimes during the studied period: (i) the regime of exchange rate 
crawling peg, from March 1995 to December 1998; and (ii) the inflation targeting 
regime from July 1999 onwards. One can notice that during both regimes, the selic 
interest rate was a widely used instrument. One can verify that during the first period, 
discrete jumps in the selic rate worked to sustain the exchange rate regime during 
periods of foreign financial market crises (the Mexican crisis in March 1995, the 
Southeast Asia crisis in October 1997, and the Russian crisis in August 1998). The jump 
in the selic rate observed in March 1999 was primarily aimed at reverting negative 
                                                 
1 Kashyap & Stein (2000) observe that required reserves on demand deposits are relatively low in the US 
(around 10%) and argue that such low ratios coupled with the process of bank deregulation could put 
some doubt on the empirical relevance of a bank lending channel for the US. In Brazil, by contrast, 
required reserves are not only quite high but also very actively used by the monetary authority. For more 
details on the various required reserves in effect during the first months of the Real plan, see Melo & 
Teles (1998, Annex IV). For the changes in the required reserves rates in the last years, see Banco Central 
do Brasil (2000 and 2001, Table: Medidas Propostas, Adotadas e em Andamento). 
  3inflationary expectations following the flotation of the exchange rate after January 1999. 
One can also observe that, after the adoption of the inflation targeting regime in July 
1999, the volatility of the selic rate has greatly reduced whereas the exchange rate 
volatility has increased. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of reserve requirement ratios on demand deposits, 
and on overall deposits. One can see that the reserve requirement rate on demand 
deposits shows a decreasing trend with discrete jumps. A different picture emerges from 
the observation of the reserve requirement rate on overall deposits. This indicator shows 
greater variability with periods of tightness being generally associated to turbulent 
periods in financial markets.  
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  The consideration of reserve requirement rates as additional policy instruments 
has one great advantage over the short-term interest rate. The literature on the bank 
lending channel has called the attention for a possible identification problem related to 
the direct impact of the coefficient on interest rate on bank loan equations: rather than 
capturing the effect on the supply of loans, which is the interpretation favored by the 
bank lending channel advocates, one could also interpret such coefficient as reflecting a 
loan demand effect.
2 But, since reserve requirements are levied solely on banks, the 
identification problem is much less acute for this instrument. In other terms, even the 
direct coefficient associated to this instrument can safely be interpreted as capturing a 
loan supply effect. 
 
3. The model 
 
The empirical test of the lending channel in Brazil takes Erhmann et al. (2001)’s 
model as a benchmark. Their model is adapted to the case where there is more than one 
policy instrument. 
                                                 
2 Kashyap & Stein (2000) suggest the inclusion of interaction terms between the policy instrument and 
bank individual characteristics to identify the bank lending channel. This strategy will also be followed in 
our paper. 
  4The market for deposits is given by just an equilibrium relationship, where 
deposits (D) are taken to be equal to money (M) with both being functions of the interest 
rate i set by the monetary authority, as follows: 
 
M = D = – ψ i + χ ,    where χ is a constant                                 (1) 
 
Bank i faces a loan demand (L
d
i) that depends on economic activity (y), on the 




i = φ1 y + φ2 infl – φ3 iL                                                   (2) 
 
The loan supply by bank i (L
s
i) is a function of the available amount of money 
(or deposits), of the loan interest rate, and of the monetary policy instrument(s) (z), 
where the instrument can either be the interest rate set by the Central Bank or the 
reserve requirements rate on deposits (σ) or both. The direct impact of the policy 
interest rate represents the opportunity costs for banks when banks make use of the 
interbank market as a liquidity source.




i = µi Di + φ4 iL – φ5 z                                                 (3) 
 
In addition, it is assumed that not all banks are equally dependent on deposits. In 
particular, the model considers that the impact of a change in deposits is smaller the 
lower the bank characteristic related to size or liquidity (xi) is:
4 
 
µi = µ0 – µ1 xi                                                            (4) 
 
The equilibrium condition in the lending market plus equations (1) e (4) result in 
the following reduced form for the model: 
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Expression (5) can be more concisely expressed as: 
 








= c  relates the reaction of bank i’s loans to the monetary 
policy interacting with its characteristic. Under the model assumptions, a significant c1 
coefficient implies that the monetary policy affects the supply of loans. An implicit 
identifying assumption is that the interest rate loan demand elasticity does not depend 
on the bank characteristic (xi), i.e. that φ3 are the same for all banks. 
                                                 
3 Souza Sobrinho & Nakane (2002) provide empirical evidence from aggregate data for the reaction of 
bank interest rates to the monetary policy in Brazil. 
4 Another bank characteristic usually investigated in the literature is its degree of capitalization (net worth 
to assets). However, due to the accounting legislation in Brazil, commercial banks have to report full 
income statements only twice a year, in July and in December. Since such statements are required to 
calculate the bank’s net worth coupled with the fact that the empirical estimates use monthly 
observations, we decided not to use banks’ capitalization ratios. 
  5The assumption of a homogeneous reaction of the loan demand is crucial for the 
identification of the monetary policy effects on loan supply. This assumption rules out 
the cases where, for example, small or large bank customers are more sensitive to 
interest rate changes. Such assumption seems reasonable for Brazil in view of the fact 
that bank loans are the main source of finance in Brazil, with few substitutes available, 
even for large firms.
5 
In addition, the empirical model allows for asymmetric responses of bank loans 
to changes in the economic activity and in the inflation rate by interacting such variables 
with bank characteristics.
6 The model also allows for dynamic adjustments and the 
estimation is done for the variables in first-differences due to non-stationarities.
7 The 
regression model is specified as follows:
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with i = 1,..., N and t = 1,..., Ti. N denotes the number of banks and m is the number of 
lags. Lit is the amount of loans by bank i in period t , ∆rt represents the first difference of 
the short-term nominal interest rate, ∆log(yt) is the growth rate of the economic activity 
indicator, and ∆inflt is the first difference of the inflation rate. The individual bank 
characteristics are denoted by xit. 
The asymmetric effects of monetary policy are captured by significant 
coefficients for the interaction terms. The literature has found that smaller (Kashyap & 
Stein, 1995 and 2000), less liquid (Kashyap & Stein, 2000; Ehrmann et al., 2001), or 
less capitalized (Peek & Rosengren, 1995) banks react more to changes in monetary 
policy. These results imply positive coefficients for the interaction terms. 
A better understanding about the sign of the interaction term coefficient can be 
gauged by examining the relevant terms in equation (6), reproduced below: 
 
ln(Li ) = ... + b ln(r) + c xi ln(r) + ... 
 
where Li is the amount of loans by bank i, r is the short-term interest rate controlled by 
the Central Bank, b is the coefficient on the direct impact of monetary policy, xi is the 
characteristic  x for bank i,  and  c is the coefficient of the interaction between the 
characteristic x for bank i and ln(r). 
It seems reasonable to suppose that  0  x ) ln(
) ln(
i < + = ∂
∂ c b r
Li  , implying that the 
amount of bank i loans reduces with increases in the interest rate. If the xi bank 
                                                 
5 In a similar study, Worms (2001) introduces a proxy for the loan demand, which allows him to model 
differences in loan demand across banks. 
6 In other terms, different values for φ1 and for φ2 among banks with different sizes, liquidity or any other 
characteristic (xi) are allowed. 
7 The dynamic specification accounts for the fact that banks react to policy changes by adjusting the 
concession of new loans. 
8 When the monetary policy indicator is the reserve requirements on deposits (σ), ∆r is replaced by ∆σ  in 
equation (7). 
  6characteristic represents liquidity, size or capitalization, then one expects to find b < 0 
and c > 0. 
 
Figure 3. Sign of the interaction coefficient between bank characteristic and 
monetary policy instrument 
 

















Suppose, for example, that xi represents the bank i liquidity position. A positive 
c coefficient implies that more liquid banks respond less to a monetary policy 
contraction represented by an increase in the interest rate.




4. Variable descriptions 
 
The dependent variable in this study is represented by freely allocated bank 
loans. Such loans refer to the portion of total bank loans that are granted at market 
interest rates. These are the loans that are, presumably, more sensitive to changes in the 
monetary policy.
10 Two main sub-accounts are subtracted from total bank loans to form 
the group of freely allocated loans, namely rural and real estate bank loans. Figure 4 
pictures the evolution of freely allocated loans (in constant value, left picture) as well as 
the share of both total loans and freely allocated loans on total assets (right picture). 
There is an upward trend in freely allocated loans both in absolute terms as well as a 
share of total loans. 
 
                                                 
9 Observe that the same observations about the sign of the c coefficient remain valid when one takes the 
reserve requirement rate as the monetary policy instrument. 
10 Nakane & Takeda (2002) estimate vector auto-regressions (VARs) to study the impact of monetary 
policy on bank balance sheet using aggregate data for Brazilian banks over the period Dec/1994 to 
Aug/2002. The authors found that overall bank credit do not respond to shocks in the monetary policy 
instruments (selic interest rate and reserve requirement rate on demand deposits). However, the found that 
freely allocated bank loans shows a negative and significant response to positive shocks in the selic 
interest rate. 
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Both rural and real estate bank loans are excluded because they are more related 
to official policies aiming at directing credit to some economic sectors at subsidized 
rates.
11 Two state-owned banks are the main financial agents used by the federal 
government to implement its credit policies devoted to the rural and real estate sectors, 
namely Banco do Brasil (BB) for rural loans, and Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF) for 
real estate loans. Table 1 shows that Banco do Brasil is reducing its market share in 
rural bank loans, which came down from levels above 70% in 1994 and 1995 to 45.3% 
in 2001. However, as shown in the top of the table, rural bank loans have also been 
reducing in the aggregate as share of bank assets. This share was close to 5% in 1994 
and 1995,and was then reduced to 3.1% in 2001.  
 
Table 1. Rural and real estate bank loans 
  End-of-year account positions 
  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001
Total bank system  Share of total bank assets
1 (%) 
   Rural loans  4.9  4.9 3.5 3.5 3.8 3.4 3.7  3.1 
   Real estate loans  11.3  11.4  10.3 9.2 10.2 9.3  7.9  2.7 
               
   Share of total rural bank loans (%) 
Banco do Brasil   
   Rural loans  72.9  73.8 67.1 61.8 62.9 58.7 56.0  45.3
               
   Share of total real estate loans (%) 
Caixa Econômica Federal   
   Real estate loans  68.9  68.3 73.2 76.9 78.9 79.3 80.9  57.5
Source: Sisbacen/Cosif, Brazilian Central Bank 
1 Total bank assets = Current plus non-current bank assets. Fixed bank assets are excluded. 
 
                                                 
11 For the same reason, we also exclude loans from BNDES, a state-owned development bank. BNDES 
grants both direct loans and loans from a network of accredited financial institutions. 
  8Table 1 also shows that Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF) owns the largest share 
in the market for real estate bank loans. Such share reached 80.9% in 2000. In 2001, 
part of the CEF real estate loans was transferred to the Treasury as part of a 
capitalization of state-owned federal banks program. Such transfer was immediately 
reflected in a large fall of real estate bank loans as a share of total bank assets. 
As discussed in section 2, two policy instruments are considered in the paper, 
namely a short-term interest rate and reserve requirements on deposits. The short-term 
interest rate is given by the selic overnight interest rate where the daily rates were 
capitalized and adjusted for a fixed 21-day period.
12 
The reserve requirement rate on overall deposits is taken as the sum of required 
reserves (in cash and in securities) plus Central Bank compulsory withdrawals 
(recolhimentos obrigatórios no BC) over total deposits.
13 
  Economic activity is proxied by the monthly industrial output as calculated by 
IBGE. Inflation rate is measured by the monthly variation of IPCA calculated by IBGE, 
which is also the official inflation targeting indicator (since 1999). 
  Two bank characteristics are considered in the paper, namely bank size (Size) 



























Bank size is measured by the logarithm of total bank assets, Ait where total bank 
assets are the sum of current and non-current bank assets. The liquidity index is defined 
as the ratio of liquid assets (Liqit) to total bank assets. Liquid assets are the sum of free 
securities and bonds and liquidity inter-bank operations (aplicações interfinanceiras de 
liquidez) less securities resales to liquidate (revendas a liquidar). 
Both bank characteristics are normalized with respect the mean calculated over 
the respective banks in the sample. Thus, the sample mean on the interaction term 
 in equation (7) is zero. The c j t it r x − − ∆ 1 j coefficients in this equation can therefore be 
directly interpreted as measuring the overall impact of monetary policy on bank loans 
for the average bank in the sample. With regard to bank size, the normalization was 
done with respect to each time period. This procedure removes undesirable nominal 
trends in this variable. 
Some outliers were removed from the sample in the econometric estimations. 
The outliers were identified as the values below (above) the 5
th (95
th) percentile for the 
distribution of the first difference of free allocated bank loans, of total bank assets, and 
of total bank deposits. This procedure was adopted due to the strong adjustment in the 
banking industry following the launching of the stabilization plan (Plano Real) in July 
                                                 
12 The Central Bank monetary policy committee (Copom) establishes the target for the annual selic 
interest rate. As an operational procedure, one can see that the Central Bank aims at targeting the daily 
selic rate given by  (1+Annual selic rate) 
1 / 252, considering therefore a year with 252 days in 12 months, 
or a month with 21 days. 
13 This ratio encompasses the reserve requirement rate on demand deposits. 
  91994. The cut-off levels used in the paper smoothes the effects of adjustments in bank 
portfolios due to bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions, and privatizations that 
occurred in the period. 
Tables 2 and 3 provide a concise picture of Brazilian banks by partitioning all 
the commercial banks operating in the country by December 2001 according to quartiles 
defined over the distribution of free allocated bank loans to total assets.
14  
 




Distribution by free allocated 
loans to total assets (1) 








Number  of  banks  45 44 45 45 179 
Mean of assets (in million of R$)  1,156  9,599  7,559  685  4,723 
Median of assets (in million of R$)  272  2,057  1,245  183  661 
(1) Ranking of the five largest banks (by assets) (centile in square brackets): 
  2nd quartile: Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), [25
th] and Banco do Brasil (BB), [39
th]. 
  3rd quartile: Banco Itaú, [53
rd], Bradesco, [61




Table 3. Liquidity, reserve requirements and selected indicators - banks classified 
by free allocated loans (December 2001) 
 
 
Distribution by free allocated 
loans to total assets 





th Above  75
th 





Assets  6.2  100 50.0 100 40.2 100  3.6  100  100 
Free  allocated  loans  0.5  1.7  29.2 13.7 58.1 33.7 12.3 78.5  23.4 
Time + Interbank deposits  4.5  15.4  46.5  19.8 38.3  20.2 10.7  62.5  21.2 
Securities and derivatives  9.8  75.0  54.1  50.8 34.9  40.6 1.2  15.9  46.9 
Liquidity  10.4 36.6 59.2 25.6 29.0 15.5 1.4  8.5  21.6 
Reserve  requirements  1.5  1.6 60.3 8.2 36.6 6.2  1.6  3.0  6.8 
Net  worth  16.1  30.9  33.7 8.0 45.2  13.3 5.1 16.4  11.8 
(1) share on total banking system (%) 
(2) share on group assets, within each quartile (%) 
 
The following comments can be made after observing tables 2 and 3: 
1)  The banks above the 75
th percentile, which characterize the group of banks that 
lend more, are relatively small. These banks accounted only for 3.6% of total 
bank assets in December 2001, with mean assets of R$ 685 million, the smallest 
of the four groups. Free allocated loans accounted for 78.5% of their total assets 
and, despite their small size, their loans accounted for 12.3% of the total loans 
by the banking sector, a share 3.4 times larger than their share of total assets; 
                                                 
14 The overall picture for other time periods is similar. In tables 8 and 9 the bank characteristics are not 
adjusted to the overall sample mean. Outliers are also not excluded. 
  102) This group of banks had a liquidity index of 8.5% in December 2001, the 
smallest of the four groups. This feature may indicate that liquidity constraint is 
not a significant factor in the determination of the response of loan supply to 
monetary policy changes, a hypothesis to be tested in the next section; 
3)  On the liability side, the main sources of funds for the group of banks that lend 
more are time and interbank deposits. These two kinds of deposits reached 
62.5% of the group’s total assets, the largest of the four groups. Within interbank 
deposits, the largest share comes from banks that do not belong to the same 
financial conglomerate (not shown in the tables). This fact may indicate that this 
group of banks may not find very hard to raise funds even though they are small 
banks; 
4)  There is another group of relatively small banks, which is the group of banks 
that belong to the first quartile, i.e. a group of banks with low lending levels. 
The important feature of this group of banks is their large holdings of securities 
and derivatives, which accounted for 75% of the group’s total assets. Due to this 
fact, their liquidity index is the largest among the four groups; 
5) Large banks are distributed in the two intermediary quartiles, representing 
average levels of lending. An important characteristic of this group of banks is 
the heavier burden represented by reserve requirements. Reserve requirements 
have a progressive rate schedule due to some exemptions for small banks. 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
The presence of the lagged dependent variable in the set of regressors required 
the estimation of a dynamic panel data. We used the GMM technique due to Arellano & 
Bond (1991). The instruments for the lagged dependent variable are their own lagged 
values in levels with a one-lag window. The other explanatory variables are taken to be 
exogenous. The selected equations refer to those whose over identifying restrictions are 
not rejected by the Sargan test (in the second step estimation) and also to those that 
reject the first-order serial correlation test
15 (both in the first and in the second step 
estimations). 
The unrestricted model has four lags of all terms in equation (7) that admit 
lagged values. Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are calculated for inference 
purposes. Inference is always based on the first step estimations, following Arellano & 
Bond (1991)’s recommendation. Non-significant coefficients are progressively excluded 
from the model. Reported results refer to the sum of the significant coefficients. All 
regressions were estimated with the variables in first-differences since they are all non-
stationary in levels.
16 
We present two sets of results. Table 4 shows the results when the policy 
instruments are the selic interest rate (selic) and the reserve requirement rate on demand 
deposits (resdem). Table 5 shows the results when the policy instruments are the selic 
interest rate and the reserve requirement rate on overall deposits (resdep).  
 
                                                 
15 See Arellano & Bond (1991) or Arellano, Bond & Doornik (2001) for an explanation of why first-order 
serial correlation is expected to be found in the model. 
16 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
  11Table 4. Impact on free-allocated bank loans – policy instruments are selic interest 
rate (selic) and reserve requirement rate on demand deposits (resdem)  
 




Log(L) 0.8907***  0.0715 
        
Selic -0.0165***  0.0038 




















Infl -0.0166***  0.0037 
 XLiq1  0.0174***  0.0040 
  XLiq1*∆selic  -0.0322* 0.0176 
  Size1*∆selic  0.0037*** 0.0011 
  Size1*∆resdem  -0.0423** 0.0183 
  Xliq1*Size1*∆resdem  0.2008** 0.0939 
  p-val Sargan   0.178  
  p-val ma1, ma2  0.000  0.438 
  Number of banks, obs.  247   9394 
* / ** / *** denotes significance at 10 / 5 / 1% 
(1) It shows the sum of the coefficients that remained significant at 5% in the final 
model. 
 
In table 4, the direct impact of changes in the short-term interest rate is negative 
and significant. On the other hand, there is no evidence that reserve requirements on 
demand deposits have a direct impact on bank loans and therefore, at least for the 
average bank, one can reject the hypothesis that the banking lending channel of 
monetary policy transmission works through this policy instrument. The variables 
related to economic activity and inflation rate are also significant and with the expected 
signs. 
The direct impact of liquidity is positive, implying that more liquid banks also 
lend more. With respect to the interaction terms, there is a positive coefficient on the 
interaction between bank size and the selic interest rate. This positive coefficient 
indicates that smaller banks react stronger to variations in the short-term interest rate. 
The negative coefficient on the interaction between bank liquidity and the selic interest 
rate could be interpreted as indicating that a monetary policy tightening relax the 
liquidity constraints faced by the Brazilian banks. This is precisely the result found and 
the interpretation given by Graminho & Bonomo (2002). We do not prescribe to this 
interpretation due to two reasons: first, the significance level of the coefficient is 
relatively high; and, second, and most important, the results reported in Table 5 show 
that this outcome is not robust. 
One of the most interest results we obtain is the negative sign on the interaction 
between bank size and reserve requirements on demand deposits. In other words, larger 
banks react more to changes in reserve requirement rates than smaller banks
17. 
                                                 
17 One possible reason for this finding is associated to the progressive nature of reserve requirements in 
Brazil, penalizing larger banks more, as noted in section 4. 
  12Table 5 reports the results when the reserve requirement rate on demand deposits 
is replaced by the reserve requirement rate on overall deposits (resdep) as an additional 
policy instrument. 
 
Table 5. Impact on free-allocated bank loans – policy instruments are selic interest 
rate (selic) and reserve requirement rate on overall deposits (resdep) 
 




Log(L) 0.7202***  0.0825 
         
Selic -0.0027  0.0044 
Resdep -0.2927***  0.1098 
    




















Infl -0.0212***  0.0041 
 Xliq1  0.0150***  0.0044 
  Size1*∆selic  0.0002 0.0017 
  Size1*∆resdep  -0.0807*** 0.0310 
  p-val Sargan   0.427  
  p-val ma1, ma2  0.000  0.929 
  Number of banks, obs.  247   9381 
(1) see the observations in Table 4.  
 
With this new policy instrument, both the direct as well as the indirect effects 
associated to changes in the short-term interest rate cease to be significant. In other 
words, reserve requirements on overall deposits dominate the policy effects. Thus, the 
direct impact of this policy instrument on bank loan decisions is now negative and 
significant. For the average bank, a variation of 1.2% in the reserve requirement rate on 
overall deposits, corresponding to a one-standard deviation change in this variable, 
leads to a long-term contraction of bank loans by 1.26%. 
The interaction between bank size and reserve requirements is still negative and 
highly significant, indicating that this policy instrument affects more the larger banks. 
On the other hand, there is no evidence of significant interactive effects of liquidity with 
the policy instruments, despite the fact that liquidity has a direct positive effect on bank 
loans. Therefore, the finding of a negative effect for this interaction in Table 4 does not 
seem to be robust. One possible explanation for this lack of significance can be 
attributed to the fact that positive interest rate shocks have positive impacts on the 
amount of overall deposits.
18 Such increase in the bank deposits work to smooth the 
liquidity constraint imposed by the rise in the interest rate. 
Thus, there is no evidence that bank loans from less liquid banks react more to 
interest rate variations. This conclusion is at odds with analogous tests performed for 
other countries where the effects of the interaction between liquidity and monetary 
policy indicators are in general very important [Kashyap & Stein (2000), Ehrmann et al. 
(2001)]. The difference in our results can be attributed to the existence of relatively high 
                                                 
18 The result that positive shock in the selic interest rate has positive impacts on the amount of overall 
deposits can be found in Nakane & Takeda (2002). 
  13levels of liquidity in the bank balance sheets due to increased holdings of public bonds 
in the last years. Such high liquidity levels can cushion the impacts of monetary policy 
tightenings reducing the effects on bank loans. 
Summing up, this paper studied monthly bank-level balance sheets from 
December 1994 to December 2001 to study the relevance of the bank lending channel in 
the monetary policy transmission in Brazil. We find evidence that the bank lending 
channel works mainly through reactions to reserve requirement changes on overall 
deposits. The effect of policy changes is stronger over large banks. This fact is due to 
the progressive nature of reserve requirements in Brazil, which affect more banks with 




The monetary policy transmission mechanism through bank loan decisions has 
recently received great attention in the literature. Kashyap & Stein (2000) show 
evidence to corroborate the existence of this channel for the US and reach the 
conclusion that the effects are mostly driven through small banks with less liquid 
balance sheets. Similar results are found by Erhmann et al. (2001) who report evidence 
that loan supply of less liquid banks are more severely affected by monetary policy in 
several European countries. 
The aim of this article was to evaluate the relevance of the bank lending channel 
in Brazil by looking at micro data from bank balance sheets and by considering other 
monetary policy instruments in addition to a short-term interest rate. Our results indicate 
that there is evidence to support the validity of the bank lending channel for Brazil. 
When the effects of changes in the short-term interest rate and in the reserve 
requirement rate on overall deposits are jointly tested, one finds that only the last policy 
instrument has an impact on bank lending decisions. Moreover, this impact is stronger 
for larger banks. 
Graminho & Bonomo (2002) also study the impact of interest rate variations on 
lending decisions for a sample of Brazilian banks. They conclude, however, that interest 
rate rises relax the liquidity constraints on bank balance sheets and therefore that there is 
no evidence of a bank lending channel for Brazil. Their conclusion seems to be 
unwarranted though for several reasons. First, they do no account for possible outliers in 
their sample as a consequence of the banking sector adjustments in the aftermath of the 
banking crisis following the launching of the stabilization plan in 1994. Many banks 
were liquidated, merged, privatized or sold to foreign financial institutions over the 
period. Second, their liquidity indicator does not net out the holdings of public bonds 
that are not available at short notice, as we do. Third, their estimated coefficients are 
probably biased due to the estimation of a dynamic panel data (with the endogenous 
lagged variable as a explanatory variable) through standard fixed effects model, creating 
a correlation between the set of regressors and the disturbance. Fourth, the result they 
found is not robust to the inclusion of another policy instrument in the form of the 
reserve requirement rate on overall deposits, as we show in section 5. 
One possible extension of the current paper is to evaluate bank level data on the 
bank loan granting decisions as opposed to our measure.
19 This extension can 
complement the results of studies with aggregate data for bank loan concession that 
                                                 
19 We proxy de flow of bank loans granted in a given month by the first difference of the stock of 
outstanding loans in the bank balance sheet. 
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